Liquidity structure

The problem nobody solves

Tokenized real-world assets (RWAs) have a fundamental problem: they are illiquid.

You can tokenize a solar farm, a vehicle fleet, or a SaaS contract. You can issue tokens on blockchain, register investors, and distribute yield. But when an investor wants to exit before maturity, there is no one to sell to. A real secondary market for RWAs does not exist on any platform in the world.

This is not a technical detail. It is the primary barrier to institutional adoption of tokenized assets. An investment fund will not commit capital to an instrument it cannot exit.

Existing alternatives do not solve it:

• Traditional RWAs (closed funds, structured notes): you buy and hold to maturity. If you need out, you negotiate bilaterally. Expensive, slow, no guarantee.
• DeFi RWAs (Ondo, Centrifuge, Maple): tokens on Ethereum or Solana, listed on AMMs. Real liquidity near zero for most positions.
• OTC markets: they exist for large institutional tickets. For $50K to $500K positions in Latin American productive assets, there is no market.

DOB Capital builds the liquidity infrastructure that allows investors to exit their positions in tokenized productive assets. Not as an accessory feature, but as core protocol architecture.

The economics of the discount

Liquidity does not appear by decree. Someone has to want to buy the position. The question is: why would a buyer want to acquire another investor's position in an asset they did not originally choose?

The answer is the discount.

A liquidity provider (LP) can buy a departing investor's position at a price below face value. If the asset yields 12% annually and the LP is offered the position at a 5% discount, the LP has just purchased a validated asset, with legal structure, generating verified cash flow, for 95 cents on the dollar. Their effective yield improves compared to having entered at the original price.

For the exiting investor: they receive 95 cents on the dollar today, instead of waiting the remaining term for 100 cents. In many scenarios, that is exactly what they need.

What makes this model unique is that liquidity providers determine their own repurchase price. There is no fixed discount imposed by the platform. Each LP evaluates the asset, its yield, its risk, and its remaining term, and defines the price at which they are willing to buy.

This creates real market dynamics:

• Competition. Multiple LPs competing for the same position compress the discount and improve the price for the seller.
• Specialization. LPs focused on specific industries, jurisdictions, or ticket ranges generate depth in concrete niches.
• Price discovery. The discount adjusts organically based on supply, demand, and asset conditions. It is not an administrative parameter: it is a market signal.

Three-layer liquidity framework

Available liquidity for early exits comes from three complementary sources with a defined order of priority:

Layer 1: External liquidity providers

The primary and most scalable source. Professional participants who contribute capital to the exit mechanism in exchange for acquiring productive positions at a discount.

LPs operate in two modes:

• Shared pool. Multiple providers co-invest in a collective liquidity fund. The discount adjusts dynamically based on pool conditions.
• Individual providers. Each LP defines their own parameters: which asset types to back, in which jurisdictions, what discount range to apply, and how much capital to commit.

LPs are not obligated to buy any specific position. They participate because the economics work: they acquire validated productive assets, with complete legal structure, at below face value.

Layer 2: Pool reserve

A percentage of raised capital retained as an immediate liquidity buffer. Not disbursed to the operator. Remains available to service exit requests when there is insufficient market depth in Layer 1.

The reserve is automatic: it requires no counterparty and no negotiation. If an investor requests exit and the reserve has sufficient funds, execution is immediate.

Layer 3: Operator co-liquidity

Capital the operator contractually commits as additional liquidity backing. Activated when Layers 1 and 2 are insufficient to cover the request.

Co-liquidity serves a dual function: it adds depth to the exit mechanism and demonstrates incentive alignment. An operator who commits their own capital as liquidity backing has the right incentives to keep their operation healthy.

Risk-based allocation

The proportion of structured layers (reserve + co-liquidity) varies according to the asset's risk profile. The profile is determined by the risk score calculated during simulation, based on the 7 evaluation factors:

Percentages are relative to total investment pool size. External provider liquidity (Layer 1) is additional to these amounts.

Example. A $500,000 pool with risk score 4 (moderate profile):

• Pool reserve: $40,000 (8%), retained from raised capital
• Operator co-liquidity: $37,500 (7.5%), contractual commitment
• Capital delivered to operator: $460,000
• Total structured liquidity: $77,500 (15.5% of pool)
• Plus additional liquidity contributed by external providers

Exit process

1. Investor requests exit (partial or full) through the platform
2. The asset's reference price is obtained
3. Liquidity provider availability is checked (Layer 1)
4. If an LP offers a price, the net position value is calculated applying the LP's defined discount
5. If no LP is available, the pool reserve (Layer 2) and then operator co-liquidity (Layer 3) are tapped
6. If sufficient liquidity exists in any layer, the operation executes and the investor receives payment
7. If liquidity is insufficient, the request enters the processing queue

Processing queue (FIFO)

Pending requests are serviced strictly in order of receipt. No exceptions for amount, seniority, or relationship. As new liquidity enters the system (new LPs, reserve replenishment, or operator contributions), it is automatically allocated to queued requests.

Risk controls

Condition-adjusted discount. When an asset shows signs of operational or financial deterioration, the exit discount naturally tends to increase: LPs demand greater compensation for assuming higher-risk positions. This protects the buyer and reflects the asset's real conditions.

Exposure segmentation. Assets with elevated risk indicators may be restricted to providers who specifically opted to back them. This protects the rest of the participants from unintended exposure.

Operational controls. Per-transaction price limits, per-asset exposure caps, and pause mechanisms for exceptional scenarios.

What this means for the operator

• Reduced net capital. The reserve is deducted from raised capital. A $500,000 pool with 8% reserve delivers $460,000 to the operator.
• Co-liquidity commitment. The 7.5% co-liquidity is a contractual obligation established in the operating agreement.
• Better access to capital. A pool with functional liquidity structure attracts investors who would not participate in illiquid instruments, particularly institutional funds and family offices.

What this means for the investor

• Real exit path. You are not trapped until maturity. If your situation changes, there is a concrete mechanism to exit.
• Market pricing. LPs compete for positions, which tends to compress the discount and improve the price you receive.
• Transparency. You know the liquidity terms before investing. The pool structure, prevailing discounts, and available depth are visible information.

Limitations

• Early exit is not an unconditional right. It depends on available liquidity at the time of request.
• The exit discount is a real cost that reduces the net return for the exiting investor.
• In stress scenarios with high simultaneous exit demand, processing may require time.
• Allocation percentages are system parameters subject to periodic calibration.

All liquidity terms are documented in the investment contracts and are known to the investor before committing capital.

Simulate your rate to see the terms applicable to your asset.